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Entrapment or Freedom 
Enforcing Customary Property Rights Regimes 
in Common-Law Africa 
Sandra F. foireman 
13.i. INTRODUCTION 
Customary land tenure arrangements in Africa have enlivened and sustained the 
role of customary leaders and authority patterns in Sub-Saharan Africa long after 
they would have otherwise faded into disuse. Because the allocation and control 
of land has meaning that extends beyond the cultural realm and into the eco-
nomic and political, those who control it are assured an important role in the 
social and political hierarchy of a community. The role of customary authority in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is tied to the colonial experience and to the decisions of colo-
nial officials to create separate categories of land rights and authority structures 
for citizens and subjects. Where colonization did not occur, as in Ethiopia, we do 
not see the same significant role played by customary leaders in land administra-
tion systems or even in conflict resolution. Thus, property rights and authority are 
intimately connected throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. 
This chapter examines customary property rights and the role of customary 
leaders in enforcing those property rights from an institutionalist perspective. 
The issue of societal benefit is at the forefront ~f this chapter, which proceeds in 
three parts. Subchapter 13.2 discusses the pervasiveness of customary tenure and 
customary authority structures throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and their genesis 
in the colonial era. Subchapter 13.3 notes the lack of consistency between stat-
utory law and customary law, which leads to a pluralistic legal setting. This part 
also identifies the winners and losers within customary legal systems. Subchapter 
13.4 discusses how we can evaluate customary land tenure patterns and custom-
ary authority. The chapter ends by suggesting ways in which customary prop-
erty rights and customary authority might persevere with a positive benefit to 
the society. 
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ip. CUSTOMARY LAND TENURE IN AFRICA 
Prior to colonization, Africa was not a vast undifferentiated and ungoverned area. 
There were city-states and kingdoms, varying greatly in size and control of territory. 
These were sc<1ttered across the continent in the most habitable areas. Between 
the city-st<1tes were often large tracts of un-administered land, forests, and deserts. 
Jn the most politically organized societies, such as that of Abyssinia' or the Ashanti 
kingdom,2 there was more resistance to colonization, which delayed or impeded 
foreign domination. In organized, pre-colonial political systems, law - what we now 
refer to as customary law - existed. However, there were also many areas of the con-
tinent untouched by customary law because the forms of political authority that 
existed were not as complex as the political kingdoms or were simply non-existent. 
During the colonial era, "customary law" regulated access to land for Africans 
and continues to govern land tenure over approximately 75 percent of Sub-Saharan 
Africa.1 However, "customary law" during the colonial period was substantially dif-
ferent from that in the pre-colonial period. as it was no longer an instrument of 
organization, but a tool of domination - a fact that has led some scholars to assert 
that it was reconstructed as something new during the colonial era.i Virtually every 
colonized country in Africa had two systems of landholding in the colonial era, one 
that was regulated by the state and one by: customary law and traditional leaders. 
The land regulated by the state was privately held by settlers and only infrequently 
by Africans. The rest of the land was governed by customary law. Although privately 
held land might have changed hands at independence, reflecting changes in pop-
ulation and political fortunes, customary land was largely left untouched, still reg-
ulated by and for the collective ethnic group. At independence, few countries had 
the capacity to embark on the herculean effort of unifying the disparate landholding 
institutions. Instead, an institutional lock-in occurred and the existing, bifurcated 
landholding system has remained intact to the present day with private and cus-
tomary lands existing and administered separately in every country in Sub-Saharan 
Africa except Ethiopia.> 
' Abyssinia was the political kingdom that was a precursor to modern-day Ethiopia. 
Located in what is currently Ghana, the Ashanti kingdom resisted British control and was not incor-
porated into the empire completely until 1902. 
1 See Interview with Clarissa Augustinus, Chief, Land and Tenure Section, Shelter Branch, UN 
Habitat, regarding her presentation Key Issues for Africa and Globally (2003), in Tororo, Uganda 
(Sept. 14, 2005). 
• See Terence Ranger, '/he Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa, in T11E INVENTION OF TRADITION 
('f. Ranger & E. llobsbawm eds., Cambridge University Press 1983); Martin Chanock, Paradigms, 
Policies and Property: 1\ Heview of the Customary Law of Land Tenure, in LAW IN COLONIAL AFRICA 
(K Mann & R. Roberts eds., Heinemann Educational Books 1991). 
5 See Sandra F. Joireman, '/'he Mystery of Capital f!omzation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Women, Property 
Rights imd Customary I .aw, 36(7) WORLD DEV. 1233 (2008). 
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Private and customary land tenure institutions each articulate a very differ-
ent bundle of rights to land, necessitating two different control and enforcement 
regimes. In the colonial era, this dual system followed racial lines; natives used 
land, white colonizers owned it. Because colonial governments did not find con-
ceptions of land holding that were equivalent to that of fee simple or exclusive land 
ownership among colonized peoples, it was assumed that landholding was vested 
in the community. Africans maintained rights to land as groups and those groups 
were overseen by a chief who controlled land allocation. White colonizers had 
their property recorded in legal documents and their disputes heard in state courts, 
while Africans pursued conflict resolution through customary authority figures and 
rarely had written documentation of their land claims. 
The belief in African communal land rights was supported by two linked admin-
istrative impulses of the colonial government: 1) the colonial administration's need 
to expropriate land and govern its occupation and exchange with some degree of 
legality; and 2) the necessity of space for the indigenous population to live and to 
farm. 6 The British and the French followed different systems of organization in their 
colonies with the French choosing to rnle directly through colonial officials, and 
the British following a system of "indirect rule" in which British colonial officials 
exercised power through local leaders.7 Under the system of indirect rule, the best 
type of arrangement to meet the indigenous population's need for space required no 
administrative oversight by colonial officials; hence the creation of native reserves, 
customary tenure areas, or tribal homelands. These areas could be administered by 
"traditional" leaders without requiring expatriate civil servants working in the adju-
dicative and administrative institutions of the colonial state. Where traditional rulers 
could not be found, they were created and empowered. Where their previous pow-
ers did not relate to the administration ofland, they were given new powers. 
The colonial state was complicit in supporting property rights claims proffered 
by traditional leaders when they served the goals of administration and control. In 
Ghana, for example, different versions of "customary law" were presented to colo-
nial officials for their support by self-interested leaders, each of whom described a 
different version of the customary practices in their community.8 Colonial officials 
were then left to decide which version they would recognize. At independence, the 
6 See Chanock, supra note 4; MARTIN CHANOCK, LAw, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE 
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (Heinemann Educational Books 2d ed. 1998); 
MAHMOOD MAM DANI, CITIZEN AND SUBJECT: CONTEMPOR.ARY AFRICA AND THE LEGACY OF LATE 
COLONIALISM (Princeton University Press 1996). 
7 See Sandra F. Joireman, Colonization and the Huie of Law: Comparing the Effectiveness of Common 
Law and Civil Law Countries, 15 (4) CONST. PoL. ECON. 315 (2004). 
8 KATHRYN FIRMIN-SELLERS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GOLD COAST 
(Cambridge University Press 1996). 
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enforcement of customary land rights typically remained with traditional leaders, 
although their role is increasingly under threat. 
Customary law is, and has been, malleable and dynamic. It has changed over time 
and, in this regard, it is similar to common law that evolves in response to changing 
circumstances and customs. Customary law was both named and developed in the 
context of colonization and it became a mechanism for the assertion of power by 
dominated groups during the colonial era. Customary law is explicitly political and 
can also be an arena for the struggle for power within a society.9 During the colo-
nial era, customary law provided a way for older men within traditional societies to 
reclaim some of the independence and control that they lost due to colonization. 
They were able to use customary law to assert control over women, younger men, 
and children within their ethnic group - the limited realm over which they were 
given authority by the colonial power. It has been observed that "those who were 
doing economically well within the limits imposed by the colonial regime were 
those who had the most interest in promoting a 'customary' view of persons. A view 
that could be presented and validated in customary terms." 10 To some extent, it is 
still the case that customary law can be used as a tool for the promotion of the inter-
ests of certain individuals who are given responsibility for its definition." In a 2002 
interview, a senior chief in Kenya recognized that customary law in the current era 
is created and molded by contemporary tr~ditional authorities, saying, "Customary 
law is what I describe.'' 12 The emphasis in this claim is on the control of the custom-
ary leader over what is defined as law. It is malleable and subject to the interpreta-
tion of leaders. Similarly, with respect to the nature of customary authority,"[ m ]any 
of the supposed central tenets of African land tenure, such as the idea of communal 
tenure, the hierarchy of recognized interests in land (ownership, usufructory rights 
and so on), or the place of chiefs and elders, have been shown to have been largely 
created and sustained by colonial policy and passed on to post-colonial states."•> 
In communal tenure areas, where an emergent land market developed, colonial 
officials suppressed it because a land market did not fit with ideas regarding the 
communal nature of African land tenure.'f Colonial officials persisted in the belief 
•1 See Pius S. Nyamhara, Immigrants, Traditional' Leaders and the Rlwdesiar1 State: 'T11e Power of 
'Communal' I ,and '/imure and the l'olitics of Land Acquisition in Cokwe, Zimbabwe, 1963-1979, 27(4) J · 
S. AFR. STUD. 771 (2001); SARA BERRY, No CONDITION Is PERMANENT (University of Wisconsin Press 
1992). 
'" Chanock, >upra note 4, at 72. 
H See FRANCOISE KI-ZERBO, LES FEMMES RURALES ET L'ACCESS A L'INFORMATION ET AUX INSTITU-
TIONS POR LA SECURISATION DES DROIT FONCIERS, ETUDE DE CAS AU BURKINA FASO (FAQ 2004). 
" Human Rights Watch, Double Stamlards: Women's Property Rights Violations in Kenya, in KENYA 11 
(Human Rights Watch 2003). 
•1 Ann Whitehead & Dzodzi Tsikata, /'oliq Discourses 011 Women'.~/ ,and Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
'/"he Implication~ of the Re-tum to the Customary, 3 (1 & 2) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 67, 75 (2003). 
" Evidence of the rapid evolution of land markets in the work of Hill (1963) on cocoa fanning and Budy 
(1979) on South Africa, also work in Zimbabwe by Cheater (1990). In Ethiopia, in traditional tenure 
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that Africans defined themselves only in terms of their group and kinship ties, even 
with regard to their economic behavior. This has led to criticism of the entrapment 
of Africans in the "world of the customary": 
European mle in Africa came to be defined by a single-minded and overriding 
emphasis on the customary. For in the development of a colonial customary law, 
India was really a halfway house. Whereas in India the core of the customary was 
limited to matters of personal law, in Africa it was stretched to include land. Unlike 
the variety of land settlements in India, whether in favor of landlords or of peasant 
proprietors, the thrust of colonial policy in Africa was to define land as a communal 
and customary possession. Just as matters of marriage and inheritance were said to 
be customarily governed, so procuring basic sustenance required getting access to 
communal land. With this development, there could be no exit for an African from 
the world of the customary.'' 
I argue that whether Africans are entrapped within customary law or freed by the 
ability to express their social and economic interests within it depends on which 
group of Africans we are discussing, as the legal recognition of customary law and 
tenure systems creates winners and losers with different interests. Because it applies 
to people as members of ethnic groups and not as citizens, customary law constructs 
a separate arena of authority beyond or outside of the state. 
in. CUSTOMARY VERSUS STATUTORY LAW: THE 
WINNERS AND LOSERS 
As in the colonial era, those who gain the most from customary systems of land 
tenure and authority are those who control it. Because customary law is unwritten 
and customary authority positions can be quite powerful and lucrative, they are 
sometimes the subject of dispute. In 2008, struggles over succession to a Ghanaian 
chieftainship resulted in twenty deaths as well as a greater number of wounded 
people. 16 The violence surrounding these struggles is evidence of the desirability of 
chieftainships. One of the reasons traditional leadership positions are sought after is 
the potential to gain from control over land. With the development of land markets 
within customary land systems, for example, those who gain the most from emer-
gent markets in land are those with the most influence over its allocation.17 
systems, there was evidence of land sales in communal tenure areas with the monetization of the 
economy. Sandra F. Joireman, Contracting for Land: Lessons from Litigation in a Communal Tenure 
Area of Ethiopia, 30 (3) CANADIAN J. AFR. STUD. 424 (1996). 
'
5 Mamdani, supra note 6, at 50. 
'
6 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Ghana: Red Cross helps victims of fighting in north (July 
10, 2oo8), available at http://www.icrc.orgM'eb/Eng/siteengo.nsf/htrnlall/ghana-news-100708?0pen 
Document&style=custo_print. 
'
7 See Admas Chimhowu & Phil Woodhouse, Customary vs Private Property Rights? Dynamics and 
Trajectories of Vernacular Land Markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, 6 (3) J. AGRARIAN CHANGE 346 (2006). 
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It is ·evident that customary authority figures benefit from the recognition of cus-
tomary law and land tenure. However, there are additional benefits that can accrue 
to a community from customary systems of property rights. There is a rich literature 
documenting the flexibility of customary land and resource arrangements. This sort 
of flexibility can be particubrly helpful in controlling common property resources 
such as forests, pasture land, and water.'8 At the same time, the use of customary 
institutions to control these resources further accentuates the divide between those 
governed by customary and those governed by statutory law.'9 
Customary law was formed for ethnic groups and is used to control and organize 
ethnic groups. As such, it is very much rooted in place rather than ethos or ideology. 
Integrating or blending customary law with statutory law, which is based on notions of 
citizenship, poses tremendous problems. Customary law relates to groups of people 
in a place and only loosely to those people who live outside of that place. Customary 
law also differs between ethnic groups in the same country. Thus, conceptions of 
citizenship that bring with them ideas of equality across national space and territory 
are often at odds with customary law. Take, for example, the pernicious problem of 
land rights for migrants. Although virtually every constitution in Sub-Saharan Africa 
enshrines notions of citizenship that transcend ethnicity and region, migrants within 
a country who seek to settle in rural areas still face tremendous difficulties in either 
purchasing or renting land to farm, and on which to build housing.2° 
As citizens of a country, migrai1ts should have the same rights to property all 
over the country. Yet, they do not, as customary land tenure systems by their nature 
exclude those who are not autochthones, or "sons of the soil.'"' This restriction on 
property ownership prevents entrepreneurial activity by nationals who might like to 
move into an area and acquire land. In fact, it may be easier for foreigners to access 
land for economic development than nationals in their own country who are not of 
the right ethnic group for a particular area; contrast this with the ease with which one 
•·' See Tor A. Benjaminsen & Christian Lund, Fomzalisation and lnfomzalisation of Land and Water 
Hights in Africa: J\n Introduction, 14 (2) EuR. J. DEV. RES. 1 (2002); CAMILA TOULMIN, PHILIPPE 
LAVIGNE DELVILLE, & SAMBA TRAORE, THE DYNAMICS OF RESOURCE TENURE IN WEST AFRICA 
(Heinemann Educational Books 2002); Philip Woodhouse, African Enclosures: J\ Default Mode of 
Development, 31 (10) WORLD DEV. 1705 (2003). 
"' See Je;;e C. Ribot, Decentralisation, Participation and J\ccountability in Sahelian Forestry: Legal 
Instruments of l'olitical-i\dministrative Control, 69 (1) AFR. 23 (1999). 
u. See V. Adefemi Isumonah, Migratio11, Land 'Jenure, Citizenship and Communal Conflict.~ in J\frica, 
9 (1) NATIONALIS~I AND ETHNIC PoL. I (2003); Ki-Zerbo, supra note JI; INTEGRATED REGIONAL 
INFORMATION NETWORK, COTE D'IVOIRE: SOLVING CONFLICT ON A SMALLER SCALE (2006). 
Nyamhara, supra note 9; Pauline E. Peters & Daimon Kamhewa, Whose Security? Deepening Social 
Con/lict over 'Customary' Land in the Slwdow of Land Tenure Refom1 in Malawi, 45 J. MODERN AFR. 
STUD. 447 (2007); MARJA J. SPJERENBURG, STRANGERS, SPIRITS, AND LAND REFORMS: CONFLICTS 
ABOUT LAND IN DANDE, NORTHERN ZIMBABWE (Bri\12004). 
" See Isumonah, supra note 20; Peters & Kambewa, supra note 20; Spierenburg, supra note 20. 
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can purchase a farm in any area of Australia, the United States, Canada, or Europe. 
Any list of losers from customary land tenure arrangements has to include migrants, 
whose right to own property and live anywhere within the territory is thwarted by 
customary land ownership patterns and customary authority. 
The second, and larger, group of losers from customary land tenure systems 
and their corresponding authority structures are women. Women in Sub-Saharan 
Africa face a distinctive social dilemma. Because of their labor, they are the main-
stay of agricultural economies; yet, married women in most African countries do 
not co-own marital property, do not have autonomous rights to lineage or family 
land, and do not have the ability to protect and retain their homes and movable 
possessions at the death of or divorce from a husband. There are some encourag-
ing exceptions to these problems of property rights in West Africa where women 
are able to maintain some rights through their natal lineages.22 There are also 
some countries, such as Ghana, Mozambique, Namibia, and Ethiopia, where 
efforts have been made to give women legal protection of property rights where 
they have not traditionally existed.23 That said, in much of Southern and Eastern 
Sub-Saharan Africa, women have not traditionally or legally shared the same pro-
tections of their property and inheritance rights as men, or women in other parts 
of the world. They face difficulty in representing themselves economically and 
legally, for example in selling their own produce or in buying new fields on which 
to grow crops.24 In Rwanda, women were not recognized as full citizens until the 
1991 constitution. 2 5 Previous to that point they were legal minors. If a Rwandan 
woman wanted to buy a plot of land, a building, or even a home, she had to either 
do so in the name of a male relative or establish a corporation that could act as 
a legal person for her.26 The position and status of women in Africa is so critical 
and so unusual that it needs to be taken into consideration, not just by feminist 
scholars, but by anyone wanting to write seriously about agricultural development, 
property rights, or capital formation. 
" See N. Thomas Hakansson, The Detachability of Women: Gender and Kinship in Processes of 
Socioeconomic Change among the Gusii of Kenya, 21 (3) AM: ETHNOLOGIST 516 (1994); interview with 
Dzodzi Tsikata, in Accra, Ghana (July 6, 2007). 
' 3 See Married Persons Equality Act 1 of 1996 (Namib.); ASKALE TEKLU, LAND REGISTRATION AND 
WOMEN'S LAND RIGHTS JN AMHARA REGION, ETHIOPIA (International Institute for Environment 
and Development 2005); Women Lawyers Demand Early Passage of Property Rights of Spouses Bill, 
GHANAIAN NEWS AGENCY, 2009; INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, MOZAMBIQUE: 
WOMEN STILL STRUGGLE FOR LAND RIGHTS DESPITE NEW LAW, (2003). 
"I In Uganda, for example, while women grow food crops, many ethnic groups view it as the job of the 
husband to sell the agricultural produce at the market. Focus group interview with Women's Guild of 
Tororo, Tororo, Uganda (Sept. 14, 2005). 
'
1 See L. Muthoni Wanyeki, Introduction, in WOMEN AND LAND JN AFRICA: CULTURE, RELIGION AND 
REALIZING WOMEN'S LAND RIGHTS (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed Books Ltd. 2003). 
'6 See id. 
Joireman 
In most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, the idea of co-ownership of marital property 
is an alien one. \Vomen are not supposed to own property but rather, under custom-
ary law, they are (or were) property. The idea of a woman acquiring property in her 
own name during marriage is incendiary, as it implies that she is not committed to 
her husband or his family. 27 In the few African countries where there are laws pro-
viding for the co-ownership of marital property, such as the family home or other 
assets, these laws have proven very difficult to enforce because they are incompatible 
with cultural practices.2s 
Typically women have secondary rights to land access, meaning they can cultivate 
land because they have married a man who is of a particular kinship group or they 
have children who are seen as belonging to a particular kinship group.29 In many 
places, once they marry and go to live with their husband's family, women are not 
viewed as having membership in their lineage, but are seen in some ethnic commu-
nities as a member of their husband's lineage and in others simply as a commodity.3° 
One women's organization in Uganda developed the slogan "Women Have No 
Home" to illustrate the difficulty women face as they are not seen as belonging to 
any kinship group.>' 
'' This point was driven home in conducting interviews on the new land law in Uganda in 2006. In an 
interview with a woman who was the regional g~nder officer for her part of the counhy, a fairly ele-
vated position and one in which she was required to assist women in defending their property rights, 
the interviewee reported that "\Vomen can't own land and have stable marriages.'' See interview with 
widow J., Mbarara, Uganda (2006). This is a sentiment that was repeated, albeit less vividly, in other 
interviews and contexts. See also Human Rights Watch, supra note 12. 
'' See Jeanmarie Fenrich & Tracy E. Higgens, Promise Unfulfilled: Law, Culture and Women's 
Inheritam:e Hight., in Chana, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 259 (2001); Susana Lastarria-Cornhiel, Impact 
of Privatization 011 Gender and Property High ts in Africa, 25 (8) WORLD DEV. 1317 (1997); INTEGRATED 
REGIONAL INFORMATION NETWORK, INHERITANCE RIGHTS STILL A THORNY ISSUE, Feb. 14, 2006. 
"' See Winnie Bikaako & John Ssenkumba, Gender, Land and Hights: Contemporary Contestation.' in 
Law, l'olicy and l'rac:tice in Uganda, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed 
Books Ltd. 2003); Wanyeki, .,upra note 25; Ingrid Yngstrom, Women, Wives and Land Hights in Africa: 
Situating Cemler Bqond the l lou.,ehold in the Debate over Land l'olily and Changing Tenure Systeni,, 
30 (1) OXFORD DEV. STUD. 21 (2002); Whitehead & Tsikata, supra note 13. 
,,, This is true even in matrilineal societies where descent is traced through the female line. That said, it 
would be wrong to suggest that in all circumstances under customary tenure women have no access 
to land through their own kin group. In West Africa, women will have some residual claim to land 
in their natal kinship group or through wider social ties. However, this is more the exception than 
the rule. There is an anthropological framework for understanding the differences in lineage attach-
ment for women in Africa. There is a bifurcation between lineage systems in which women maintain 
an identity in their natal lineage after marriage and those lineage systems in which they do not. If a 
woman maintains a social identity formed by her natal lineage after marriage, she is likely to have 
property rights associated with that lineage. However, if she is "detachable" and is identified with her 
husband's cla11 or lineage after marriage, then she is likely to have few, if any, socially recognized prop-
erty claims in her natal lineage. Hakansson, supra note 22. 
'' This was articulated as a sloga11 by the Mifumi Project, a Ugandan NCO active in women's issues. 
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The fact that women have only secondary rights to land is inequitable, but the 
degree to which it becomes problematic depends on demand for land in a given 
area. Some anthropologists have praised the flexibility of traditional customary 
arrangements because they can adapt to changing family composition more read-
ily than more formalized systems.32 Where demand for land is low, this is almost 
certainly true. However, when the value of land becomes higher it is easier for tra-
ditional leaders to find themselves unable to accommodate all requests for land 
to farm. Where there is a high demand for land, migrants, divorced women, and 
women in general are most likely to face exclusion.n 
Women's property rights and access to land are linked to inheritance patterns. 
Under customary law, daughters tend to inherit less than sons, and often nothing at 
all.H Inheritance can also be problematic for surviving spouses. Aili Tripp notes that 
in Uganda, "under customary law ... a woman may have jointly acquired land with 
her husband and may have spent her entire adult life cultivating land, but she can-
not claim ownership of the property. If he dies, the land generally goes to the sons, 
but may also be left to the daughters. Nevertheless, (the husband] may still leave 
the wife with no land and therefore no source of subsistence.''35 With the mortality 
effects of AIDS, civil conflict in Africa, and decreasing life expectancies for men and 
women, institutionalized inheritance structures are of particular interest in under-
standing patterns of capital formation. 
In many polygamous households, if the head of household dies, any childless 
wives will receive nothing and will have to return to their families.36 Because these 
women have not provided the lineage with heirs, they have no status and no fur-
ther link to any member of the lineage. Therefore, they can no longer expect to 
receive access to lineage land on which to farm or live. Women with children are 
in a slightly less precarious position. They are still not regarded as members of the 
" See Angelique Haugerud, Land Tenure and Agrarian Change in Kenya, 59 (1) AFR. 6i (1989); Jean 
Ensminger, Changing Property Rights: Reconciling Fomwl and lnfomzal Rights to Land in Africa, in 
THE FRONTIERS OF NEw INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (J. N. Drobak & J. V. C. Nye eds., Academic 
Press 1997 ). 
ll See In Zimbabwe, land-allocating authorities viewed divorced women in particular as social misfits. 
Nyambara, supra note 9, at 777. 
34 This is true even in Islamic areas where sharia law controls inheritance for women. In Nigeria, in 
the northern states where sharia law is recognized, women still do not inherit as dictated by sharia 
law. The reason given is that according to the Maliki school of sharia law, Nigeria is an area in which 
Islam was imposed by conquest and therefore some allowance for pre-existing customs, urf, must be 
allowed. Hussaina J. Abdullah & Ibrahim Hamza, Women and Land in Northern Nigeria: The Need 
for Independent Ownership Rights, in WOMEN AND LAND IN AFRICA (L. M. Wanyeki ed., Zed Books, 
Ltd. 2003). 
31 Aili Mari Tripp, Womens Movements, Customary Law, and Land Rights in Africa: 17ze Case of 
Uganda, 7 (4) AFR. STUD. Q. 1, 6 (2004). 
36 See Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 29. 
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lineage, however, if they are taking care of minors, their property rights will some-
times be respected.'? 
Some studies have argued that inheritance rights for women are not a problem. 
In Kenya, for example, one study found that most women are able to hold onto 
their land after the death of a husband by turning to the community as a whole to 
gain support in legitimizing the wife's claim to the land.>8 In this study, a woman 
losing her home and land after a husband has died was the 304exception rather 
than the rule. This would be consistent with other studies in Malawi, Swaziland, 
and Uganda finding that women are able to negotiate customary law and maintain 
usufruct rights to land through social networking.39 However, these studies con-
tradict the weight of evidence emphasizing the vulnerability of women's property 
rights after the death of a spouse. Other studies in Kenya document that spousal 
loss of property is a frequent occurrence.-1° In Uganda in 1995, the Federation of 
Women Lawyers (FIDA) reported that 40 percent of the cases they handled were 
related to the harassment of widows and property grabbing by their husbands rela-
tives.-!' Poverty and scarcity of resources can tax the goodwill of family members. 
If a woman has property left by her husband that is viewed as valuable, she may 
find herself cast off with no land to cultivate and her household goods appropri-
ated by members of the lineage. In Uganda in the Luwero and Tororo areas, about 
29 percent out of a total of 204 widows indicated that property was taken from them 
following the death of their husbands:+2 In Zambia, "(i]n an area where livestock 
represents one of the few reserves of asset wealth, it was found that in the preceding 
five years, 41% of female-headed households with orphans had lost all their cattle 
and 47% had lost all their pigs."-1> 
Women's loss of property upon the death of their husband is a human rights issue, 
but it is also an economic problem. As women tend to be the ones cultivating the 
17 See Interview with B, Tororo, Uganda (Sept. 14, 2005); RICHARD S. STRICKLAND, To HAVE AND TO 
HOLD: \\'OMEN'S PROPERTY AND INHERITANCE RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF HJV/AJDS IN SuB-
SAHARAN AFRICA (International Center for Research on Women 2004); Tripp, supra note 35. 
'' See M. Aliber, C. Walker, M. Mach era, P. Kamau, C. Omondi, & K. Kanyinga, Overview and Synthe:;is 
of Hesearch J!indings, in THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS ON LAND RIGHTS: CASE STUDIES FROM KENYA 
(Human Sciences Research Council 2004). 
N See Laurel L. Rose, Women'., Strategies for Cu:;tomary Land Acce:;s in Swaziland and Malawi: 
A Comparative Study, 49 (2) AFR. TODAY 123 (2002); Lynn S. Khadiagala, Justice and Power in the 
Adjudication of Women's Property Hights in Uganda, 49 (2) AFR. TODAY 101 (2002). 
4" See Human Rights Watch, supra note 12; RITU VERMA, GENDER, LAND AND LIVELlllOODS IN EAST 
AFRICA: THROUGH FARMER'S EYES (International Development Research Centre 2001). 
4' See Bikaako & Ssenkumba, supra note 29, at 250. 
4
' See LAELIA ZoE G1LBORN, REBECCA NYONYINTONO, ROBERT KABUMBULI, & GABRIEL }AGWE-
WADDA, MAKING A DIFFERENCE FOR CHILDREN AFFECTED BY AIDS: BASELINE FINDINGS FROM 
OPERATIONS RESEARCH IN UGANDA I (Population Council 2001). 
41 Strickland, supra note 37, at 24. The study gave no indication of how this property was lost. Id. 
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land to provide food for their families, their loss of land, livestock, and moveable 
property has economic consequences for their children and for society as a whole. 
13+ EVALUATING SOCIAL WELFARE 
In spite of these considerations of equity, strong arguments have been made for the 
benefits of customary land tenure systems and customary adjudicatory mechanisms. 
In areas where land is relatively abundant, customary law can effectively regulate 
the distribution of land in a manner that has fewer transaction costs than using a 
more bureaucratized registration system. In these settings, formal systems of prop-
erty rights show few benefits over customary systems of land rights and, when new 
systems of property rights are adopted from the top down, they are unlikely to be 
implemented fully as the transaction costs of land registration are too high to make 
it worthwhile for people to register their land. After the Ugandan Land Act of 1998 
made it possible for people on customary land to title their land and exchange it 
through governmentally recognized methods, individuals in land-abundant areas 
still chose to go through locally recognized institutions of exchange rather than the 
legal system to document land transfers.+! These individuals felt their land was suf-
ficiently secure to preclude any need to go beyond the recognition of members of 
their local government in a land exchange. Until the value of land or its attributes 
increases sufficiently to offset the transaction costs, titling and more formalized land 
transfers will not be embraced.45 Moreover, rather than promoting security of ten-
ure, titling efforts may lead to higher levels of conflict over land and thereby reduce 
productivity.46 
Given the health and welfare demands on African states, there seems to be lit-
tle reason to interfere with a customary law system that is working well in a land-
abundant setting. In these areas, state mechanisms to regulate the registration and 
transfer of land are unlikely to be utilized or enforced because individuals feel their 
security in ownership or occupancy is sufficiently robust. However, no country has 
abundant land resources in all areas, especially not in capital cities, which invariably 
have shantytowns and slums that house people without the money or connections 
necessary for land access. Moreover, there is increasingly a mix between customary 
tenure arrangements and modern state-administered tenure systems, particularly in 
44 See Elin Hemysson & Sandra F. Joireman, On the Edge of the Law: The Cost of Informal Property 
Rights Adjudication in Kisii, Kenya, SSRN (2007). 
4
' See YORAM BARZEL, A THEORY OF THE STATE: ECONOMIC RIGHTS, LEGAL RIGHTS AND THE SCOPE 
OF THE STATE (Cambridge University Press 2002); TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NoT 
So WILD, WILD WEST (Stanford University Press 2004). 
46 See Klaus Deininger & Raffaelle Castagnini, Incidence and Impact of Land Conflict in Uganda, in 
THE WORLD BANK POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER (The World Bank 2004). 
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peri-urban areas. It is in these areas where tenure systems and authority structures 
mix and demand for land tends to be high that the two systems clash most visibly. 
Where land is scarce and population densities are higher, land allocation is con-
tested, conflict over land is more frequent, and resort to the courts for dispute settle-
ment and recognition of land transfer is more likely. Consistent with the economic 
literature on institutional change, ample evidence exists demonstrating the break-
down of institutions and the innovation of new ones when land values increase 
in Africa.-17 In areas where land has a higher value, customary land ownership 
patterns can empower and enrich those who make decisions regarding its alloca-
tion. "Authority in land whether vested in the chiefs, or in the government offi-
cials and political leaders, can in tum, lead directly to private economic benefits for 
these actors, derived from land accumulation, patronage and land transactions."-18 
Traditional leaders can practice the politics of exclusion, denying resources to 
groups with less political power, such as divorced women and migrants, who are 
easily identified and denied access to land communally held.-19 
When and where is it appropriate to try to explicitly undermine customary leader-
ship and customary tenure, with the huge social costs that are entailed in any such 
attempt? This is not a politically correct question to either ask or answer. Yet, given 
the push for economic growth and better macroeconomic policies, it is worth con-
sidering by what criteria we might judge the effectiveness of any land tenure system 
or customary authority structure. One approach would be to assess the customary 
land tenure_ institutions from the 30 perspective and examine the extent to which 
they are well-<lefined, divestible, and defendable. However, in this chapter I would 
like to avoid the question of whether and how customary land should be bought or 
sold. Literature from the new institutional economics, as well as my own interview 
data from studying property rights across Sub-Saharan Africa, point to a set of crite-
ria that can help us evaluate the net social welfare resulting from any institutional 
;7 See John Bruce, Lmd Reform Planning and Indigenous Communal Tenure (1976) (S.J.D. disser-
tation, School of Law, University of Wisconsin); Joireman, supra note 14; SANDRA F. JornEMAN, 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: THE STATE AND 
LAND, 1941-1974 (Ohio University Press 2000). 
;' Camila Toulmin & Julian Quan, /ntmductirm, in EVOLVING LAND RIGHTS, POLICY AND TENURE IN 
AFRICA (C. Toulmin & J. Quan eds., IIED 2000). 
;o See The ~lid-Zambezi Rural Development Project in Zimbabwe illustrates this problem. Jn this case 
it was the government of Zimbabwe that in the 1990s recognized an area of communally held land 
in Dande. They sought to reallocate the land in a more ecologically sustainable way that would be 
conducive to agricultural development and the resettlement of families living on fonner European-
owned land. In the process of doing so, they effectively stripped land rights from migrants who had 
been living in the area peacefully and cooperatively for years. Spierenburg, supra note 20. By not 
recognizing that migrants were part of this community, and instead adhering to the old idea of com-
munally held lands belonging collectively to one people group, the government repeated the error of 
colonization. Id. 
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structure. Below, I develop a rubric that recognizes the joint nature of tenure sys-
tems and authority structures. As far as I am aware, there is no area on the continent 
where customary leaders are recognized but customary tenure is not, or vice versa. 
In this case, it is wholly appropriate to consider the definition and the defense of 
property systems as a unified social institution that includes the rules of customary 
land tenure and the authority structures that enforce it.5° The criteria I use to assess 
customary institutions are: predictability, accessibility, equity, effectiveness, and 
restraint. A measurement rubric is included in the appendix to this chapter. 
First, any social institution must be transparent and predictable in terms of access 
and structure. This should be the case whether it is a social norm or a statute. If I 
own a house and want to improve it, I would like to know that I will own the house 
in three years; otherwise my benefit might not be worth the costs of making any 
changes. A property rights enforcement regime such as a customary dispute resolu-
tion process should assist people in maximizing their well-being by enabling long-
term investment.5' 
Second, social institutions must be accessible to function well. Courts, mediators, 
or mechanisms that are so far away as to be too costly to reach in terms of money, 
time, or both are ineffective in resolving problems.52 With "simple, local mecha-
nisms, to get conflicts aired immediately and resolutions that are generally known 
in the community, the number of conflicts that reduce trust can be reduced."5> 
Economic historians have also observed the importance of accessible conflict res-
olution mechanisms in the development of markets. Where conflict resolution 
mechanisms exist, markets with impersonal exchange can develop and thrive.54 
50 In Botswana and Kenya, however, although traditional leaders and customary land tenure co-exist, the 
leaders have been legally stripped of any control over land. See The Chieftainship Act of 1987; Chiefs' 
Act of 1997. 
5
' See Louis De Alessi, Cains from Private Property: The. Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAW (T. Anderson & E McChesney eds., Princeton University 
Press 2003); Hernando De Soto, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (Basic Books 2000); Douglass C. North 
& Robert Paul Thomas, An Economic Theory of the Growth of the Western World, XXIll, (1) THE 
ECON. HIST. REV. I (1970); WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1997' THE STATE IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (Oxford University Press 1997). 
5
' See Brynna Connolly, Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology, 
38 CONN. L. REV. 239 (2005); Henrysson & Joireman, supra note 44; Minneh J. Oloka-Onyango 
Kane & Abdul Tejan-Cole, Reassessing Customary Law Systems as a Vehicle for Providing Equitable 
Access to fustice for the Poor, World Bank (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRANETSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/ Kane.rev.pdf; Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, 
Review of Experience in Engaging with Non-State Justice Systems in East Africa, in INSTITUTE OF 
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, Sussex University (2003). 
53 Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 (3) J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
137 (2000). 
54 See AVNER GREIF, INSTITUTIONS AND THE PATH TO THE MODERN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM 
MEDIEVAL TRADE (R. Calvert & T. Eggertsson eds., Cambridge University Press 2006). 
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Third, social institutions must meet minimum standards of equity.» Those that 
work only for one ethnic group or exclude one segment of the society are undesir-
able. Institutions that solve problems based on the highest payment received from 
participants are also unacceptable (based on standards of equity). The less biased an 
institution, the better it will be able to serve everyone within a society regardless of 
their social location. 
Fourth, any kind of allocation or enforcement regime must be able to serve its 
role authoritatively and completely. Resolutions that are temporary, transient, or 
must eventually involve another institution are disadvantageous.56 Temporary solu-
tions indicate the powerlessness or insignificance of the institution and may also 
identify a cumbersome extra step in attempting to achieve a goal, whether it be land 
access or the resolution of a land conflict. 
Lastly, social institutions are desirable to the extent that they do not rely on unre-
strained violenceY Private allocation or enforcement of property rights through 
violence can both consume valuable resources and undermine the potential for 
economic progress.>8 Additionally, confl.ict resolution that occurs through violence 
can exacerbate, rather than resolve, disputes. 
Using these five criteria - (1) predictability, (2) accessibility, (3) equity, (4) effec-
tiveness, and (5) restraint - we can assess the net benefit of different property rights 
regimes and customary authority structures. Traditional authority structures and 
conflict resolution mechanisms are strongest in the areas of accessibility, effective-
ness, and restraint and weakest in terms of equity and predictability. Traditional lead-
ers and conflict resolution mechanisms are often far more accessible than national 
courts (high, according to the rubric in the appendix). They are able to effectively 
adjudicate most property conflicts and only rarely lead to decisions that needed to 
be appealed to national court systems (medium high). Moreover, traditional leaders 
and conflict resolution systems seldom use violence (medium high). However, they 
are not equitable in their adjudication of disputes as they favor the interests of men 
over women and autochthones over migrants even though both are citizens of the 
;; See Cary D. Libecap, Distrihutional hme.~ in Contracting for Property Rights, in THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (E. C. Furuhotn & R. Richter eds., Texas A&M University Press 
1<)91); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (Princeton 
University Press 2005). 
,,, See TERRY ANDERSON & FRED McCHESNEY, PROPERTY RIGHTS; COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND 
LAW (T. Anderson & F. Mc:Chesney eds., Princeton University Press 2003); North, supra note 55. 
57 See Fred S. McChesney, Covemment J\s Definer of Property Rights: Tragedy Exiting the Commons?, 
in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND LAw (T. Anderson & F. McChesney eds., 
Princeton University Press 2003); Barry Weingast, Constitutions as Govemance Structures: The Political 
foundations of Secure Markets, 149 (1) J. INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECON. 286 (1993). 
;' See TERRY L. ANDERSON & LAURA E. HUGGINS, PROPERTY RIGHTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
FREEDOM AND PROSPERITY (Hoover Institution Press 2003). 
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same country (low). Additionally, traditional leaders and conflict resolution mecha-
nisms tend to make decisions that are compromises rather than a clear victory of one 
party over another in a dispute. While this type of decision making can preserve the 
integrity of the community, it renders traditional conflict resolution systems unpre-
dictable in terms of the kinds of decisions that are made and the factors that are 
taken into consideration. 
Although it will not be attempted here because of space considerations, the land 
tenure and dispute resolution systems of the government in each country could also 
be subjected to the same set of assessment measures and these institutions would 
rank high in some areas and low in others. Differences in the traditional and state 
institutions would indicate the reasons why people would choose one over the other 
or "fonun shop." 
13.5. WHITHER TRADITIONAL AUTHORITY STRUCTURES? 
What can we learn from the use of this assessment measure and the issues that have 
been raised earlier in the chapter to better understand the role of traditional leaders 
and customary law in the contemporary African setting? The first major lesson is 
that there are conflicting authority structures that are delivering different bundles 
of social goods. Increasingly, government officials are going to be implicitly doing 
what I am explicit about here - assessing the effectiveness of the different existing 
institutional systems. In this context, I would argue that if traditional leaders want to 
maintain any sort oflegally recognized authority, they must consider their roles care-
fully. They must articulate an institutional identity that is not based on representing 
a single ethnic group or a geographically bounded set of interests, but instead a set 
of societal concerns that may have importance beyond the locality. For example, 
they need to articulate their roles not as leading or constructing the legal parameters 
for their ethnic group, but as preserving and protecting the land (or forests or water 
resources) as the patrimony of all citizens of the country. 
In a similar way, traditional leaders must begin to articulate the interests of the 
whole society - not just the men. If traditional leaders do not begin protecting and 
advocating for the economic and social well-being of women and children in their 
con1111unities, they will find themselves slowly sidelined by alternative sources of 
societal power as women's groups begin to challenge their authority through legal 
action and legislation. 
This leads to the second major lesson, which is that constitutional standards of 
equity matter. If customary leaders and customary law are to remain relevant, they 
must align with constitutional standards of equity and citizenship. Increasingly 
around Sub-Saharan Africa, we are seeing constitutional challenges to customary 
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authority based on citizenship rights. The Bhe case in South Africa is one example.59 
In Uganda, women have articulated their demand for land in terms of constitutional 
guarantees of equality of citizenship and equality of economic rights.00 
Lastly, traditional leaders and customary dispute resolution systems have a clear 
advantage in their ability to provide a cheaper and more accessible source of land 
allocation and conflict resolution than the state institutions in most contexts. If they 
can allocate land and resolve conflicts in a manner that aligns with constitutional 
concerns for equity and citizenship rights, then they are likely to be accommodated 
rather than undermined in any reform of property rights and conflict resolution 
systems that occurs. 
13.6. CONCLUSION 
This chapter began by discussing the genesis of the customary land tenure systems 
and their endurance into the present era. It then addressed how customary law 
creates a bifurcation of winners and losei:s in the society. Those who benefit from 
customary law are traditional leaders, men and communities who are able to use 
customary law to protect important resources. Losers under customary systems are 
migrants, local entrepreneurs, and women. Given this split in the society between 
winners and losers under customary law, this chapter proposed a rubric to assist in 
assessing the overall impact of customary law on social welfare. Following this, I 
offered some suggestions for how customary law and customary authority structures 
might endure in their usefulness to society by playing to their advantages of local 
knowledge and accessibility and addressing the weakness of inequity. 
59 SE.'e llhe v. '/he Magistrale, Khayiditslw 2004 (2) SA 544 (C) (S. Afr.). In South Africa, women are 
guarauteed equal rights under the law by a constitution that also recognizes the rights of traditional 
leaders to allocate land. Given that in customary tenure systems women do not have access to land in 
their own right, it was inevitable that a case would be brought on behalf of a woman denied access to 
land. In South Africa, the decision of the constitutional court in the llhe case famously argued that a 
woman must be allocated land by a traditional leader. However, the reason given in the ruling was not 
that she had equal standing as a citizen of South Africa and a member of that kin group, but rather 
that she had children that were members of that kin group and their rights could not be denied. What 
was important in the llhe case was that the children were girls. A decision that these girls deserve 
access to land because they are members of the kin group was an affirmation of their membership 
in the lineage - a membership that was not previously explicit in the case of girls or women. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the llhe case, see Christa Rautenbach and Willemien du Plessis, Refomz 
of the South 1\frican Customary Law of Successirm: Vinal Nails in the Customary Law Coffin?, in this 
volume. 
r,, See Interview with Carol Bunga ldembe, Kampala, Uganda (Sept. 12, 2005); interview with Atuki 
Turner, Kampala, Uganda (Sept. 16, 2005). 
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APPENDIX 
Institutional Assessment Rubric 
Low Medium High 
Predictability Unclear what the cost Not entirely apparent Costs and time frame 
will be to utilize the why or how decisions are clear up front. 
institution. Unclear are made. Costs, Needed documentation 
whether the institution documentation, obvious. Nature of 
will work or how it will and other needs decision-making 
work. unspecified. process is clear. 
Accessibility Not affordable for the Affordable for some Fees are affordable for 
average person either people in the society, the average person, 
due to fees or side although beyond proximate venue to 
payments demanded. the reach of others, people who will be 
Location requires a proximate to some, accessing. 
large sacrifice in terms limited need for side 
of time or money payments. 
to reach. 
Equity Only serves the needs Discriminates against Serves the needs 
of some members of some members of of all members of 
society. Discriminates the society, serves the the community. 
on the basis of sex, needs of others. No discernable 
ethnicity, or other trait. discrimination based 
on individual traits. 
Effectiveness Unlikely to resolve Can resolve Will resolve problem 
problem. Will need conflicts in certain and/or provide service 
to pursue some other circumstances, finally and completely. 
parallel or competing although in others it 
process to achieve goal. is necessary to pursue 
other institutional 
remedies. 
Restraint Processes rely on While generally free Completely free from 
violence or the threat of from violence or unrestrained or illegal 
violence, intimidation, intimidation, at times use of violence and 
or other harm. these can enter into threats. 
the process. 
